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Budgeting in State Government: The Case of South Carolina *
GARY H. BROOKS

Uni.versity of Mississippi
JOHN R. DEMPSEY
College of Charleston

A budget is, most basically, a statement of planned expenditures that commits
financial resources to the proposed activities of the person or institution making the
budget. Since budgets normally must be designed to remain within the limits of
available resources , the making of budgets necessarily involves the making of choices.
In cases where the cost of proposed activities exceeds the resources available for
allocation , some of those activities may have to be curtai led or eliminated. Often the
·wants' of the budget-makers must be separated from legitimate needs, and expenditures for the former elimin ated , or postponed until additional sources of income can be
obtained. When the shortage of resources is severe, even legitimate needs may
sometimes have to be ordered, and those needs with a lower order of urgency given a
relatively sma ller share of the availab le money.
Budgeting in the public sector involves all of these difficulties. As agents of the
public in the allocation of public funds, government budget-makers must distribute
resources among competing claims in a manner that is both financially sound and
politically palatable. When budgetary claims exceed the resources available, the job of
the government budget-maker is a difficult one indeed. Though the increasing ly
"uncontrollable" nature of government budgets may have reduced the policy formulation role of budget-makers in recent years , 1 a government's budget is still the best
place to look for its answer to Harold Lasswell's question, "Who gets what, when, and
how?" 2 A government's budget tells us, in graphic form, how that government's
priorities have been estab lished. In Aaron Wildavsky's terms, "If one asks, 'Who ge ts
what the government has to give?', then the answers for a moment in time are recorded
in the budget." 3
This study deals with the budgetary process in South Caro lina, and examines the
financial and political dynamics of the way that state's budget is made. In one sense , of
course , such a narrow focus limits our discussion and makes us reluctant to general ize
about our findings. The single case study approach, however, has its advantages. By
focusing on South Carolina, we deal with a classic budgeting cho ice situation. Un like
the federal government, South Carolina is prohibited (by Article X, Section 2 of the
State Constitution) from engaging in deficit spending. It s budget makers, then, are
• An earlier version of this paper was presen ted at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the South Carolina Political
Science Association.
1 In recent years, increasingly large percentages of government budgets have become "immune' from the
control of the formal budgetary (or appropriations) process. This has resulted from the fact that an ever- larger
portion of government budgets is currently being allotted to entitlement programs, retirement payments to
public employees. and other budget items whose costs are determined by a combination of authorizing
legislation and demographics. In the federal budget for fiscal year 1976, it is estimated that seventy-five percent
of the expendjtures are 'uncontro llab le' in this sense (up from sixty percent in 1967), and a recent Budget and
Control Board estimate indicated tl1at approximate ly fifty percent of the state's budget is committed in this
manner.
2

3

Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What , When, 011d How? (New York: Peter Smith, 1950).
Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little , Brown and Co. , 1964), p. 4.
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faced with the hardest of political choices - reconciling citizen claims forfinite public
resources . Unlike the federal government , South Carolina can not borrow money from
its citizens 4 to create budget deficits and thus give itself'room' to move in attempting to
mediate competing requests for budget dollars. The climate created by this situation is
one in which an extra dollar given to claim (or agency) A necessitates that a dollar be
taken away from claim (or agency ) B. The political volatility of this situation is obvious.
Another advantage to the single state study is the opportunity it affords to examine
the subject in depth , and to make the kinds of year-to-year and agency-to-agency
comparisons that can be extremely useful, but are often impractical in studies oflarger
scope. The questions posed by this study , in fact, lend themselves to exploration in the
single state format . Before beginning a discussion of those questions , a brief discuss .ion
of the mechanical and chronological aspects of South Carolina's budgetary process is in
order.
The Budget-Making Process
Though a host of popular , political , flscal, and financial factors converge on , and
ultimately affect the South Carolina budget , this analysis focuses on the three major
actors in the process: the executive departments and agencies making budget requests ,
the State Budget and Control Board , and the State Legislature. For analytical purposes , it is best to view the executive departments as claimants in the budgetary
process - each petitioning the state , on behalf of their programs and constituencies ,
for what they feel is their rightful share of budget dollars. The Budget and Control
Board (BCB) and the legislature should be considered budget-makers , though our
analysis will reveal that the executive departments , by adoption of certain strategies ,
can themselves exert control over their budget shares and are in at least an indirect
sense , 'decision-makers ' in matters of state budgeting.
In July of each year , South Carolina 's executive department heads and their
respective budget officers are called to a meeting hosted by BCB, where revenue
projections for the upcoming year are discussed and technical instructions are issued to
the departments for the preparation of their budgets , which must themselves be
submitted to BCB by September 15. Each department's budget request must include
that department's organization chart and a description of its activities. Its budget
request for the upcoming year must obviously be included , as must comparative
figures for the two previous fiscal years. Since South Carolina does not practice
'zero-based' budgeting , only that portion of the budget which represents an increase
over last year 's appropriation tends to be justified and defended in detail.
Behveen September 15 and the end of the calendar year , the financial fate of the
state's executive departments is in the hands of the Budget and Control Board. The
South Carolina Budget and Control Board has an impressive array of formal powers. It
is unique in the structure of South Carolina government in the sense that it 'belongs' to
both the executive and legislative branches. Its members include the Governor (its
chairman ), the State Treasurer , the Comptroller General (both of whom are elected
officials) and the respective chairmen of the House Committee on Ways and Means and
the Senate Committee on Finance. The Board's Executive Secretary, the State Auditor, supervises the professional staff.
4 The State Government of South Carolina is empowered to 'borrow' money for capital improvements . No
personal services, operatingt'Osts. etc ., can be paid for with these borrowed monies . Additionally , Section 20of
the General Appropriations Act of 1975-76 places a five percent limit on the portion of the state 's budget which
can be spent on debt servic e. Thus the state is doubly limited : borrowing can be undertaken only to finance
capital improvements , and it must be limited to an amount small enough so that debt service constitutes less
than five percent of the state's budget.
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Like its counterpart on the federa l leve l, the Office of Management and Budgeting, 5 BCB has the responsibility of screening, pruning, and coordinating the executive
deparhnents' budget requests prior to their submission to the legislature. This is
accomplished in open session and in staff consultation between September 15 and the
end of each calendar year. BCB also has responsibility for ensuring that departmental
budgets · are prepared in the proper manner , and for making the estimated revenue
predictions necessary to produce a 'balanced' budget.
To accomplish its many tasks, BCB is split into six Divisions , the most important of
which , for budgetary puq)oses, are the Finance Division and the Research/Statistical
Division. 6 Very briefly it is the re ponsibility of the Research/Statistical Division to
estimate revenues for the upcoming fiscal year, and of the Finance Division to assist
the BCB members in preparing the actual budget document in accord with the
estimated revenues. Phrased another way, the Research/Statistical Division sets the
parameters of debate by defining the projected size of the 'pie,· and, once the size of the
'pie' is determined , the Finance Division assists the Board members in 'slicing' it up, or
setting the state 's financial priorities.
Once BCB has received the deparhnents' budget requests, heard justifications of
those requests in open session, and (assisted by professional staff members from the
Finance and Research/Statistical Divisions) made its decisions as to how the states
anticipated revenues are to be allocated , the budget document itself is printed and
presented to the House of Representatives , where it is referred to the Committee on
Ways and Means. Unlike the federal budget, which is always divided into a number of
appropriations bills, the South Carolina budget is treated as a single entity , and
considered as a single General Appropriations Bill. The department request , in
addition to the BCB recommendation, is included in the document. Passage in the
House of Representatives is followed by consideration in the Senate , where the bill is
assigned to the Committee on Finance. As with other legislation , a Conference
Committee attempts to iron out any House/Senate differences. The normal consideration period for the bill is four to five months after its submission (usually in January )
though provisions exist for the passage of continuing resolutions in the event that
debate has not ended by the beginning of the new fiscal year. Indicative of the broad
formal powers of the BCB is the fact that all legislative appropriations are considered
'maximums ' and are subject to reduction by the BCB if that body has evidence to
suggest that revenue collections are falling below revenue estimates , and that continued spending at appropriated levels would result in a budget deficit. 7 Figure 1
describes the chronology of South CaroHna's budget process.
While narratives and flow charts are useful in helping us to understand the
fundamentals of the state budgeting, we seek to go beyond these descriptions to
answer questions on a number of fronts . It is important , for example, for us to know if
the State Budget and Control Board has in reality the influence in budgeting matters
that its statutory authorities would indicate. It is also important to know how much (if
• Use of the term 'counterpart" may be too strong here. [n many ways, BCB and 0MB are very different
organisms . 0MB is, of course , an exclusively executive agency, with a Director appointed by the President and
a large professional staff. It has functions which BCB does not (e.g., legislative clearance ), and it lacks some of
the powers and functional responsibilities which BCB possesses (e.g. , personnel and retirement policies).
8
The other four Divisions of the Budget and Control Board are General Services, Personnel, State
Retirement , and a new division concerned with supervision and control of the State's motor vehicles .
7 The similarity between this situation and that of Presidential "impoundment" at the federal level is
obvious , but the differences between the two situations deserves some comment. The crncial difference, from
the point of view of political conflict, is that BCB"s actions at the state level are not as threatening to the
legislature since the legislature is represented on BCB itself - a situation which, of course , does not obtain
when a President, in concern with 0MB , decides to impound Congressionally appropriated funds.
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any) influence is exerted over the budget by the state legislature. Perhaps most of all, it
is important to understand the role which the executive departments' own budgeting
strategies play in their eventual budgetary success. If the final budget outcome is
viewed, as we consider it here , as the 'dependent' variable, it is important to understand which of the host of 'independent' variables affecting it are most influential in
determining its eventual shape and size.
Agency Acqu-isitiveness, BCB Support for Expansion,
and Agency Budget Expansion Success
For good or ill , one of the most significant characteristics of state budgets in recent
year has been their steadily increasing size. 8 This growth in the magnitude of state
budgets is frequently a major concern of citizens and their elected officials. Budgetar-y
growth is also a matter of great importance to state agencies which are concerned with
their own funding levels and which usually demonstrate a desire for continued
growth. 9 With these considerations in mind, we have adopted agency budget expansion success as the dependent variable for this study . By focusing on budget expansion
success, we have selected a variable which is of importance to a wide variety of political
and governmental actors.
Agency budget expansion success refers to the degree to which an agency is
successful in obtaining a higher level offunding for the coming budget period that the
agency enjoyed in the previous budget year. For the purposes of this study , budget
expansion success is defined as the percentage of the current year's budget appropriated by the legislature for the coming budget period. A budget expansion success score
of 110 would mean that the legislature appropriated 110 percent of the previous year 's
expenditure level for the particular agency examined.
While the final determination of agency budget expansion success is made by the
legislature , studies of the budgetary process in the American states indicate that
legislative decisions are influenced substantially by non-legislative actors such as
specialized budget review groups and individual state agencies. 10 Two factors which
have been found to affect legislative decisions substantially are the type of budget
strategy adopted by individual agencies and gubernatorial support for agency budget
expansion . Given the thrust of these prior research efforts , an examination of the
degree to which agency budget expansion success in South Carolina is associated with
these two variables appears to be a logical point at which to begin an examination of the
South Carolina budgeta1-y process.
In submitting a budget request , state agencies may pursue strategies ranging from
conservative requests only slightly higher than their previous appropriations to acquisitive requests substantially higher than their past levels offunding. Operationally ,
agency acquisitiveness is defined as the agency's request for the coming budget period
as a percentage of current expenditures . A score of 130 on this index indicates that the
agency requested 130 percent of its current expenditures for the approaching budget
period or an increase of 30 percent.
The bulk of research concerned with the budgetary process has emphasized the
efficacy of acquisitive budget strategies for the achievement of budget expansion
8 In 1969, state government expenditures from their own funds totaled 12.9 billion dollars . By 1974,
estimated state i:overnment expenditures from their own funds had reached 81.0 billion dollars . See Advisory
Council on Intergovernmental Relations , Trends in Fiscal Federalism, 1954-1974, February , 1975, p. 17.
9
See Deil S. Wright . "Executive Leadership in State Administration ." Midwest journal of Political
Science , 11 (February, 1967), pp . 1-26.
1
For a comparative state analysis of the impact of non-legislative actors on legislative budget decisions ,
see Ira Sharkansky , "Agency Requests , Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures ,"
American Political Science Review , 62 (December , 1968). pp. 1220-1231.
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success. 11 The general finding is that while acquisitive budget requests are subjected
to relatively severe short-term cuts, the magnitude of those cuts is not sufficient to
reduce the growth rates of acquisitive agencies to the levels realized by nonacquisitive
agencies . In terms of budget expansion success , the existing literature indicates that
the acquisitive agency is in an advantageous position.
Once agency requests have been made and agency budget strategy determined ,
the budgetary process usuaJly provides for a review of agency requests by an intermediate actor. As discussed earlier, the Budget and Conh·ol Board plays this intermediate role in South Carolina. For a wide variety of reasons , the recommendations of
a specialized, professional budget review agency such as BCB can be expected to have
a strong influence on the final decisions of the South Carolina legislature. State budget
documents are highly complex and confront decision-makers with difficult decisions.
In such an atmosphere of uncertainty and complexity, legislators naturally look for
convenient decision cues or reference points in their attempts to ease the task of
decision-making. 12 The recommendations of BCB offer legislators these important
reference points. As a result , it is logical to expect legislative support for agency budget
expansion to be influenced at least to some degree by the extent of BCB support for
expansion. BCB support for expansion is defined as the BCB's recommendation for an
agency as a percentage of the agency's existing appropriations level. A score of 105 on
this index indicates that the BCB recommended 105 percent of the current operating
budget for the coming fiscal period or an increase of 5 percent.
Fortunately , South Carolina budget documents supply the data essential for this
analysis. State budget records provide current expenditure data by agency, including
the original budget requests for each agency , the amount recommended for each
agency by BCB, and the sum appropriated by the legislature.
The data for th.is analysis are drawn from the budget years 1969-1970 through
1975-1976. Thirty state agencies were selected for study. 13 A number of criteria were
used to select the agencies included in the analysis. An attempt was made to include all
agencies which had existed without major structural changes throughout the period of
the study and which had received relatively substantial state appropriations. In addition, the selection process was designed to insure that representatives of a number of

11 See Sbarkansky , Ibid. ; Ira Sharkansky and Augustus Turnbull, "Budget-Making in Georgia and Wisconsin: A Testofa Model ," Midwest journal of Political Science, 13 ( ovember, 1969), pp. 631-645; and AndrewT.
Cowart , Tore Hansen and Karl-Brik Brofoss, "Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision levels in
the Norwegian Urban Setting ," American Political Science Review, 69 Qune, 1975), pp. 543-558.
12 The tendency of policy-makers to look for decisional 'cues' to simplify their tasks and help them avoid
uncertainty is widely discussed in the 'incrementalist' literature, and in the literature dealing with legislative
behavior. See (for a discussion of the former) Nicos P. Mouzelis, Organization and Bureaucracy (Chicago:
Aldine, 1972) pp. 120-142. Also see R. M. Cyert and J. C. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Finn ,
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall , 1963) pp. 128-48.
13 The agencies included in the analysis are : Budget and Control Board; Commission on Higher Education ; University of South Carolina ; Clemson University ; Medical University of South Carolina ; State Department of Education ; State Board for Technical and Comprehensive Education ; Educational Television Commission; South Carolina Arts Commission; Department of Health and Environmental Control ; State Department
of Mental Health ; Department of Mental Retardation ; Commission of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse ; Department of Social Services ; State Agency of Vocational Rehabilitation ; Children's Bureau; Commission for the
Blind; Department of Corrections; Probation , Parole and Pardon Board; Water Resources Commission ; State
Forestry Commission ; Department of Agriculture ; Wildlife and Marine Resources Department ; Department of
Parks, Recreation and Tourism ; State Development Board; State Dairy Commission; Department of Labor;
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission; Department of Veterans Affairs; and Public Service Commission.
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types of agencies (education, health , welfare, and natural resources) were included in
order to permit comparative analysis across agency types. 14
The initial task of this paper is the de termination of the degree to which legislative
appropriation decisions in South Carolina are influenced by the two variables mentioned above - agency acquisitiveness and BCB support for expansion. By examining
the explanatory power of agency acquisitiveness and BCB recommendations , it is
possible to identify the parameters within which the legislature exercises independent
influence over final budgetary decisions.
Analysis by Agency Type

The results of the initial simple correlation analysis by agency type are presented in
Table One. Focusing on the relationships across all agencies for the entire seven year
period, one notes that agency acquisitiveness and Budget and Control Board support
for expansion are associated with agency budget success with the legislature. For the
1969-1970 to 1975-1976 period across all agencies, the simple correlation between
agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion success is .29 (significant at the .001
level). Over the same period , the simple correlation between BCB support for expansion and budget expansion success is .58 (significant at the .001 level ).
These results seem to indicate that past research findings concerning the influence
of agency acquisitiveness and executive recommendations over legislative budget
decisions are applicable to South Carolina. The relationships are positive and in both
cases are high enough to meet the criterion of statistical significance. As reported in
earlier studies, 15 the relationship between executive recommendations and budget
expansion is stronger than the relationship between acquisitiveness and budget expansion success. BCB recommendations appear to influence legislative decisions more
strongly than agency budget strategies.
Our interest , however, is not limited to the relationships between these variab les
for all types of agencies for the entire seven year period covered by this analysis. Tab le
One also demonstrates that the relationships behveen acquisitiveness , BCB support
for expansion , and budget expansion success vary depending upon the type of agencies
being studied. Acquisitiveness and BCB support are associated significantly with
budget expansion success in most cases and the relationship between BCB support and
expansion success is stronger than the acquisitiveness-success relationship in all cases.
The striking feature of Table One , however , is the variation in the strength of these
relationships across agency types. The simple correlation coefficients for acquisitiveness and expansion success range from .27 for natural resource agencies to .67 for
welfare agencies. The simple correlation coefficients for BCB support and expansion
success range from .31 for natural resource agencies to .88 for education agencies.
While the findings reported in Table One generally support the conclusions drawn
by past research dealing with state budgetary processes , the variation observed in the
strength of the relationships across agency types points to hvo conclusions: l ) agency
acquisitiveness may be a more effective strategy for some types of agencies than others,
and 2) the influence of executive recommendations over legislative budget decisions
14 Included as education agencies were : Commission on Higher Education ; University of South Carolina ;
Clemson University : Medical University of South Carolina : State Department of Education ; State Board for
Technical and Comprehensive Education ; and Educational Television Commission . Included as health agencies were : Department of Health and Environmental Control ; State Department of Mental Health ; and
Department of Mental Retardation . Included as welfare agencies were : Department of Social Services ; State
Agency of Vocational Rehabilitation ; Children 's Bureau ; and Commission for the Blind. Included as natural
resources agencies were: Water Resources Commission; State Forestry Commission ; Department of Agriculture ; Wildlife and Marine Resources Department ; and Department of Parks , Recreation and Tourism.
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may vary from agency type to agency type . Whil e a study of one state canno t arrive at
definitiv e answers concerning th e genera l app licability of th ese findings or at
generalizabl e explanations of them , th e findings reflected in Table One raise interesting questions worthy of further study and demand that some attempt at explanation be
made .
Th e relatively low correlations between acquisitiveness and expansion success and
BCB support and expansion success for natural resources agenci es is one of the more
str iking findings pr ese nt ed in Table On e . Compared to th e other thr ee types of
agencies, the two independ ent variables have relatively ' little relationship to budg et
expans ion success among natur~ reso urces agencies. In an attempt to explain this
anomalous finding, the scores of th e natural resources agencies for each of the thr ee
variables were re-exa min ed. Th e dev iation of these agencies from the general patt ern
found among the other thr ee types of agencies can be attributed large ly to the unusual
budgetary circumstances of one age ncy - th e D epartment of Wildlife and Marin e
Resources. In thr ee of the seven fiscal yea rs studi ed , this agency's appropriations
actua lly excee ded the agency's budg et req uests. ee dless to say, this is a most unusual
budgetary eve nt. We can only assume that certain political circumstances - not
obvious to the resea rcher condu cting a quantitativ e study of this sort- surround that
agency and crea te a situation in which the legislatur e fee ls committed to funding th e
agency at unusually high leve ls. 16 Th e commitment of th e legislatur e is so strong in this
regard that it not only acts largely independent ofBCB recommendations , but goes so
far as to excee d actual agency req ues ts in its final funding decisions .
In addition to the low relationships found for natural resource agencies, the high
acqu isitive-s uccess relationship for welfare agencies stands out in Tabl e One. Although
much of the litera tur e argues that agency acquisitiveness works most successfully for
agenc ies which have strong leve ls of political support , 17 our analysis indicates otherwise. South Carolina is ce rtainly not a state known for its support for welfare liberalism .
(In fact, during th e seven year period examined, the state welfare agencies expanded
their budgets at a rate below th e average for th e other types of state agencies
studied. 18) Despit e the lack of support for welfare programs in South Carolina, agency
acquisi tive ness has its strongest relationship with budg et success among the state's
welfare agencies.
Two possible explanations for this finding are offered . First , agencies possessing
little effective political supp ort may have to be mor e acquisitive in order to achieve
even a minimal amount of expan sion. Agencies with substantial political clout can
expect suppo rt for agency expansion to arise from those int erested in and supportive of
the agency's programs, and thus may not nee d to push as aggressively in order to
expand success folly. This interpr etation leads us to conc lude that stronger associations
15

See Sharkansky , Ibid .
One possibl e explanation of the legislatur e's unusual generosity toward the Depa rtmen t ofW ildlife and
Marine Resources centers around the influence of the Chainnan of the Senate Commit tee on Finance. Prior to
the passage of a Senate rule limiting members to a single comm ittee, tl1e Chainnan of Senate Finance had been
the chairman of the aut hor i,,ation com mittee dealing with th e Depar tment of Wildlife and Marine Resources.
The Chairman has been reported to be an ardent suppor ter of this agency and its activities in his basically rural
county . In other words, the agency appears to be a "pet" of the Senate's most influential member in the area of
budgetary decisions .
17 This contention is made both implicitly and explicitly in the Lltera tur e. For explicit examp les of the
argument, see Sharkansky and Turnbull, ibid.; and Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations
Submittee: A Comparative Study of Budge t Strategies," Midw est j ournal of Political Science, 9 {August , 1965),
pp . 254-281.
18 Across the seven year period studi ed, the average welfare agency expanded its budget by 16.8 pe rcent
compare d to 19.3 percent for natura l resources agenc ies, 23.4 percent for edu cation agencies, and 25.6 percent
for health agencies .
16
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between acquisitiveness and budget expansi~n success will be found among state
agencies with low levels of support than among agencies with higher levels of support.
A second explanation lies in the intergovernmental structure of state welfare programs.
State politics and budget making does not take place in a vacuum. Federal programs
and politics substantially influence state policy and politics. This influence is particularly pervasive in the area of welfare policy. Much of the money appropriated by the
legislature for welfare programs generates additional federal dollars which otherwise
would not enter the South Carolina economy. In other words, we are suggesting that
the finding of a high degree of association between acquisitiveness and budget expansion success in state welfare agencies may mean that acquisitive budget strategies work
more effectively for agencies whose programs generate matching federal dollars than
for agencies whose programs are financed solely or predominantly by state dollars.
Our major concern, however, is the degree to which legislative budgetary decisions can be explained by the combined influence of agency acquisitiveness and BCB
support for expansion. In order to explore this question, the statistical technique of
multiple coJTelation analysis has been employed. The multiple correlation coefficient
(R2 or the coefficient of determination) gives us a summary measure of the total amount
of variation in the dependent variable "explained" by the two independent variables. If
the R2 's produced are high, we can conclude that the legislature is largely responding
to agency budget strategies and BCB recommendations rather than acting as an
independent influence in the South Carolina budget process. On the other hand if the
independent variables exhibit little explanatory power, we can conclude that the
legislature is largely independent of these hvo sources of external influence. Our
assumption is that any variation in the dependent variable (agency budget expansion
success ) not explained by the independent variables (agency acquisitiveness and BCB
support for expansion ) results from independent legislative inlluence. 19
Table Two indicates that the degree to which legislative appropriations decisions
can be explained by agency acquisitiveness and BCB support for expansion varies
substantially across agency types. While the two independent variables are able to
explain 77 percent of the variance in the agency budget success of education agencies,
the same two variables account for only 12 percent of the variance in the budget success
of natural resources agencies. These results indicate that independent legislative
influence is not constant across all types of agencies and is particularly high in the case
of natural resources agencies.
These results point to the dangers involved in budgetary analyses which examine
the relationship between acquisitiveness , executive recommendation , and budget
expansion success across a sample of state agencies without examining the relationships
which exist among significant sub-groupings of state agencies. If one were to focus
attention only on the overall explanatory power of the hvo independent variables
across all agencies, the coefficient of determination of. 34 would lead one to conclude
that legislative budget decisions in South Carolina are influenced by agency acquisitiveness and BCB recommendations to a significant degree but that one must look
elsewhere (perhaps to the legislature itself) in order to explain the remaining 66
percent of the variance in agency budget expansion success. By examining the relationships behveen acquisitiveness , BCB support , and budget expansion success in subgroups of state agencies , however, one quickly notes that this relatively low level of
19 We recognized that this assumption is problematical. Other extra-legislative variables not included in
this analysis could well explain the remaining variation in agency budget success . The degree of unexplained
variance discovered in this analysis, however , can be taken as an indication of the maximum possible legislative
innuence over agency budget expansion. The amount of legislative influence could of course be less than this

maximum amount.
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explanation is largely the result of an exceptionally low level of explanation achieved in
one particular type of agency sub-group - natural resources agencies. For all other
types of agencies, the two independent variables explain over 50 percent of the
variation in agency budget success reaching a high of 77 percent for education agencies.
To this point , our analysis of the relationship between ·agency acquisitiveness, BCB
support for expansion, and agency budget expansion success across types of agencies
leads to the following conclusions:

1) agency acquisitiveness and BCB recommendations are important influences
over legislative budgetary decisions ;
2) BCB recommendations have a greater impact on legislative decisions than
agency acquisitiveness;
3) the explanatory power of agency acquisitiveness and BCB support for expansion
varies considerably across agency types and is particularly low for natural
resources agencies;
4) agency acquisitiveness as a budgetary strategy is more effective for some types of
agencies than for others and is particularly effective for welfare agencies ;
5) the strong relationship behveen acquisitiveness and budget expansion success
for welfare agencies may indicate that a) budget expansion success for agencies
with little political support is more dependent upon agency acquisitiveness
since little other support can be expected , and/orb) agency acquisitiveness is a
more productive budget strategy for agencies conducting programs in which
state appropriations are matched by federal funds; and
6) budgetary analyses in which attention is focused on the relationships between
acquisitivenss , executive recommendations, and agency budget expansion success across a sample of state agencies may obscure important differences in these
relationships which exist among significant sub-groupings of state agencies.
Analysis Across Time
Our focus on one state makes it easier to extend our analysis across time. This
section of the study presents the results of a longitudinal analysis of the relationships
between agency acquisitiveness, BCB support for expansion , and agency budget
expansion success.
Table Three demonstrates that the relationships between these key budgetary
variables are not constant over time. Substantial variation in the magnitude of the
simple coJTelation coefficients between the hvo independent variables and the dependent variable exists across the seven years included in this analysis. The simple
correlation for acquisitiveness and budget expansion success ranges from .02 (in
1971-72 and 1975-76) to .76 (in 1973-74). Similarly, the simple correlation coefficient
for BCB support and budget expansion success ranges from .13 (in 1972-73) to .96 (in
1971-72).
The results of the multiple correlation analyses for each of the fiscal years (presented in Table Four) emphasize the year-to-year shift in the explanatory power of the
two independent variables more effectively. When multiple correlation analyses are
pe1formed for each of the seven budget years , one finds that the explanatory power of
the independent variables ranges from a high of. 92 in fiscal year 1971-72 to a low of .33
in fiscal years 1972-73 and 1974-75. In some years, legislative appropriations appear to
be dependent largely upon agency budget strategies and BCB recommendations. In
other years , legislative actions appear to be relatively independent of these influences.
Generalizations about the extent of influence over budget decisions enjoyed by state
agencies , the Budget and Control Board, and the legislature, which ignore the dimen-
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sion of time , would appear to be ill advised. Table Four pres e nts a rather complicated
picture of shifting patterns of influence over time and raises some significant and
interesting questions: Why does the dependency of the legislature on the decisional
cues provided by agency requests and BCB recommendations vary from year to year?
Do the years of high dependency on external decision cues have any common features?
Do the years oflow dependency share common features? At this point , we can arrive at
some exploratory and tentative answers to these questions.
A glance at the results of the multiple correlation analysis for all seven years quickly
reveals that BCB support for expansion is contributing a greater share of the explained
variation in agency budget success than is agency acquisitiveness (a partial correlation
coefficient of .53 compared to a partial of .08). A further look at Table Four reveals that
in three fiscal periods (1969-70, 1972-73 , and 1974-75) the independent variables
combined explain less than 50 percent of the variation in agency budget success. In
these years, one might expect to find lower leve ls of explanatory effectiveness for both
of the independent variables. Table Four demonstrates that this is not the case. The
explanatory power of agency acquisitiveness is generally high er in these three fiscal
years. On the other hand , a consistent pattern of substantially weaker relationships
between BCB support and agency budget success is evident. In other words, we can
more accurately say that these years represent periods in which the legislature is
unusually non-responsive to the budgetary recommendations of BCB and slightly
more responsive to agency bu·dgetary strategies.
To this point , we have noted substantial variation in th e ability of agency acqu .isitiveness and BCB support for expansion to explain agency budget success in the
legislature . We have also discovered that this variation is attributable to year-to-year
changes in the responsiveness of the legislature to the recommendations ofBCB. Our
attention now turns to the question of whether the years in which high explanatory
effectiveness is achieved are in any way different from the other years included in the
analysis.
The four flscal periods in which agency acquisitiveness and BCB support for
expansion account for over 50 percent of the variation in agency budget expansion are
also years in which agency budget expansion success falls below the average for the
total seven year period . For the seven year period, the average agency increased its
budget by 19.6 percent over the previous year's expenditure level. For the four years
in which the legislature was most dependent upon external decision cues, the average
agency budget increased by only 10.8 percent. In the three years characterized by low
dependency on external decision cues, the average agency budget increased by 31.6
percent . There is evidence then to suggest that budgetary decisions of the legislature
are less dependent upon BCB recommendations in relatively "goo d" budget years,
i.e. , years in which the state budget expands at a more rapid than normal pace.
The legislature's greater relative independence from the recommendations ofBCB
in "goo d" budget years can be explained by the traditional budgetary roles ofBCB and
the legislature. For the seven year period examined, the average agency request was
for 38.1 percent increase over the past year's funding level. Over the same period, the
BCB recommended an average increase of only 10.2 percent. The legislature actually
appropriated an average increase of 19.6 percent. Thus the usual budget pattern is for
the legislature to appropriate less than the amount requested by the agency but more
than the amount recommended by BCB . Years in which the legislature is more
successful in restoring such cuts are years in which budget expansion is relatively high
and years in which the legislature is less mindful of BCB recommendations.
Given South Carolina's constitutional prohibition against deficit spending, the
influence of the legislature in the budgetary process is largely dependent upon the
revenue forecasts for the upcoming year. If incoming revenues appear available, the
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legislature can restore BCB cuts with relative ease and play a major independent role
in the budgetary process. Lean state revenue forecasts restrict the discretion of the
legislature in restoring BCB cuts and make the legislature increasingly dependent
upon the budget recommendations of BCB. In addition, BCB traditionally estimates
revenue forecasts conservatively in order to insure that state spending will not exceed
state revenue. Since BCB recommendations are made at an earlier point in the budget
process, later revenue projections are usually higher than the initial estimates used by
BCB. These higher revenue projections enable the legislature to distribute these
"additional" revenues to state agencies in addition to the original estimates ofBCB. If
state revenue projections remain the same or decline, the legislature can only restore
one agency's budget cuts by taking an equivalent amount of dollars from the budgets of
another agency or group of agencies. Given the controversy which surrounds such
decisions "to rob Peter in order to pay Paul ," it is not surprising that the legislature
generally opts to follow the original BCB recommendations in lean budget years.
Our analysis of the influence of agency budget sh·ategies, BCB recommendations,
and legislative appropriations across time leads to the following conclusions:
1) the dependency

of the legislature on the decision cues provided by state
agencies and BCB varies considerably over time ;
2) this variation in legislative dependence upon external decision cues is largely
the result of vaiying legislative dependence on BCB recommendations;
3) variation in legislative dependence upon BCB recommendations is associated
with variation in the rate of growth in the state budget, i.e., years in which the
state budget expands at a higher than normal rate are years in which the
legislature is influenced to a lesser degree by the decisions of BCB;
4) the combination of the legislature's role as a restorer of BCB recommended
·budget cuts and the state's constitutional injunction against deficit spending
means that the legislature can more easily play an independent role in the
budgetary process in those yeai·s in which anticipated revenues appear to be
relatively ample in relation to agency requests and in which later revenue
projections ai·e higher than the earlier projections utilized by BCB.
Summary
A number of conc lusions , or observations, ai·e appropriate in light of the analysis
this paper has attempted. Most immediately, it is apparent to us that factors both
internal and external to state agencies affect their relative success in expanding their
budgets. Both agency acquisitiveness (an internal factor, in this context) and BCB
support (an external factor) appeai· to be associated with budget expansion success. In
selected years, legislative support (also an external factor) seems to be important.
Awareness of the impo1tance of agency acquisitiveness as a determinai1t of an agency's
budget success should free us from the notion that agencies' budgets are solely
dependent vai·iables, whose sizes and shapes are determined by forces external to the
agencies themselves. While the agency's final budget is, of course, a dependent
vai·iable in this context, we must remember that one of the independent variab les
responsible for shaping it may well be the budgeting strategy adopted by the agency
itself.
Our analysis sheds some light, we feel, on literature previously published on state
government budgeting. Most impo1tant, it uncovers significant yeai·-to-yeai·, and
agency-to-agency differences in the extent to which South Carolina conforms to the
model developed by Sharkansky to explain influence patterns in state budgeting. As
Tables Two and Four noted, the combined explanatory power of agency acquisitiveness and BCB support differs considerably from year to year, and from agency-type to
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agency-type, indicating that the South Carolina budgetary process is not a static
phenomenon susceptible to easy categorization. This finding, it would seem , illustrates the complexity of state budgeting and calls into question typologies of state
budgeting processes which are based on single year observations and which treat all
state agencies as a single category.
A final conclusion concerns the considerable utility of the case study approach in
attempting to examine the budgetary processes of the states. No look at South Caro lina's budgetary process could be complete or accurate without an awareness of the
constitutional and institutional contexts in which that process takes place . Without
such an awareness , for example , we would not have been able to understand the
connection between revenue estimates and the extent of independent legislative
influence over budgetary decisions . Budget-maldng , like other forms of policymaking , occurs in and is affected by an environment. The case study approach is an
approach well suited to create an awareness of that environment's importance.
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TABLE ONE. Coefficients of Simple Correlation
Between
Agency
Budget Expansion Success
and the Independent
Vari•
ables , by Type of Agency
Typ e of
A ge ncy
BCB Supp ort
Age ncy
A cqui sitive ness f or Expan sion
All Age ncies
.29"'**
.58***
Edu cation
.47***
.88***
Health
.43*
. 73***
Welfare
.67***
.82***
Natural
Resour ces
.27
.31*

••• = Significant
• = Significant

at .001 level.
at .05 leve l.

TABLE TWO. Results of Multiple Correlation Analysis, by Agency
Type
All Age ncies
Simpl e
Variabl e
Acqui sitive ness
.29"'**
BCB Support
.58***
Multipl e Corr elation Coefficient
Coefficie nt of De te rmin ation

Partial
.08
.53***
.58
.34

Edu cation Age ncies
Variabl e
Simpl e
Acqui sitivene ss
.47***
BCB Support
.88***
Multipl e Corr elation Coefficient
Coefficie nt of Determin ation

Partial
.10
.84***
.88
.77

Health Age ncies
Simpl e
Variab le
Acqui sitive ness
.43*
BCB Support
. 73***
Multipl e Co rrelation Coefficie nt
Coe fllcie nt of De termination

Partial
.12
.66***
.74
.54

We lfare Agencies
Variabl e
Simpl e
Acqui sitiveness
.67***
BC B Supp ort
.82***
Multipl e Correlation Coe fllcient
Coe fficient of De termin ation

Partial
.15
.64***
.82
.68

Natu ra l Resources Age ncies
Variabl e
Simpl e
Partial
Acqui siti e ness
.27
.15
BCB Supp ort
.31*
.23
Multipl e Co rrelation Coe fllcie nt
.34
Coefficie nt of Determin ation
. 12
*"* = Significant at th e .001 leve l.

•• = Significant
• = Significant

at th e .OJ leve l.
at the .05 level.
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TABLE THREE. Coefficients of Simple Correlation Between Agency
Budget Expansion Success
and the Independent Variables , by Year
A gency
BCB Supp ort
A cquis iti veness for Expan sion
Year
.29***
.58***
Overall
.49"'**
.65***
1969-70
.35*
.82***
1970-71
.02
.96***
1971-72
.57***
. 13
1972-73
.76***
.86***
1973-74
.56***
.45
1974-75
.72***
1975-76
.02

••• = Significant
• = Significant

at .001 level.
at .05 leve l.

TABLE FOUR. Results of Multiple Correlation Analysis, by Year

All Years
Variabl e
Simpl e
Acqui sitiveness
.29***
.58***
BCB Supp ort
Multipl e Co rre lation Coefficie nt
Coefficie nt of D eterminati on

Partial
.08
.53***
58
.34

1969-1970
Variabl e
Simpl e
Acqui sitiveness
.49"'**
BCB Supp ort
.65***
Mu Iti pie Corr e lation Coe fficie nt
Coe fficie nt of De te rmin ation

Partial
.22
.53***
.67
.45

1970-1971
Variabl e
Simpl e
Acqui sitiveness
.35*
.83***
BC B Supp ort
Multipl e Co rr elation Coe fficie nt
Coe fficient of De tenninati on

Partial
.19
.80***
.82
.68

1971-1972
Variabl e
Simple
Acqui sitive ness
.02
.96***
BCB Supp or t
Multipl e Corr elation Coe fficie nt
Coe fficient of Dete rmin ation

Partial
.11
.96***
.96
.92

1972-1973
Variabl e
Simpl e
Acqui sitiveness
.57***
BCB Supp ort
.13
Multipl e Co rrelation Coefficie nt
Coe fficie nt of De te rmin ation

Partial
.56***
.05
.75
.33
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Partial
.61***
.79***
92
.84

1975-1976
Variable
Simple
Acquisitiveness
.02
BCB Support
.72***
Multipl e Correlation Coefficient
Coefficient of Det e rmination

Partial

••• = Signific-ant at
** = Signiflcant ~t
• = Signiflcant at

1973-1974
Simple
Variable
Acquisitiveness
.76***
BCB Support
.86***
Multiple Correlation Coefficient
Coefficient of Determination

1974-1975
Variable
Simple
Acquisitiveness
.45
BCB Support
.56***
~ultiple Correlat ion Coefficient
CoelRcient of Determination

91

IN ST ATE GOVERNMENT

-.1-1
.40*
.58
.33

the .001 level.
the .OJ leve l.
the .05 leve l.

Partial

-.09
.72***
.72
.52

